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The Rust That Corrodes: State Action, Free Speech, and
Responsibility
Peter M. Shane*
In an age of overworked superlatives, the extraordinary life and
character of Alvin Rubin defy adequate expression. Not a day has passed
since my clerkship fourteen years ago that I have not reflected on his
counsel and on his example. No one surpassed "ABR" as judge, teacher,
writer, or friend.
Among Judge Rubin's most remarkable traits was the deep sense
of personal responsibility that attended his every official act. He never
cut corners. Beneath the glass of his desk was a note to himself: "Every
case is important to its parties." It is no surprise that legal ethics and
judicial administration were among his chief areas of scholarly concern.
The meticulous and ethical fulfillment of judicial responsibility to the
public was the very ideal he embodied.
It thus seems fitting to devote an essay in memory of Judge Rubin
to two areas of constitutional law where the theme of responsibility has
been much overlooked, although not by him.' These areas are "state
action" and freedom of speech. I wish to focus, indeed, on an aspect
of "free speech" doctrine that raises the same conundrum that the state
action doctrine poses: what is public; what is private?
I can illustrate my linkage of these two doctrinal areas with an
example: Imagine a privately owned and operated family planning clinic
financed almost entirely through federal funds. As I write this, that
funding would subject the clinic to federal regulations barring most clinic
Copyright 1992, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Professor of Law, University of Iowa; law clerk to Judge Alvin B. Rubin, 1977-
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The title pun refers not only to Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991), but
to Judge Rubin's reference, discussed at p. 1590 below, to "the rust of [a] judge's approval
of discrimination," which "rubs off onto society, corroding the national character ......
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 233 (5th Cir. 1990) (Rubin, J.,
dissenting).
1. Judge Rubin's judicial reluctance to condone irresponsible official behavior was
evident in more contexts than are explored in this article. See, e.g., Stern v. Tarrant
County Hosp. Dist., 778 F.2d 1052, 1061 (5th Cir. 1985) (Rubin, J., dissenting) (unequal
treatment inflicted by state officials in violation of state law should be deemed irrational
and therefore necessarily violative of equal protection); Hill v. Mississippi State Employ-
ment Serv., 918 F.2d 1233, 1241 (5th Cir. 1990) (Rubin, J., dissenting) (negligent failure
of state employment agency employees to treat black job applicant fairly should not be
a defense to a Title VII race discrimination claim).
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employees from providing information to a client on the use of abortion
for family planning.' Suppose that, under the express, but independently
adopted policy of my hypothetical clinic: "No physician or other em-
ployee performing his or her work adequately for one year shall there-
after be discharged except for cause." Imagine further that a nurse
employed two years by this clinic is summarily dismissed for allegedly
violating the abortion gag rule.
Under current Supreme Court decisions, the restriction on the nurse's
speech-what would surely be protected private free speech outside the
clinic context-is permissible because the government is helping to fund
the clinic's counseling services.3 On the other hand, the dismissal without
notice or hearing-clearly unlawful if the nurse were a government
employee, rather than the employee of an independent contractor 4-
would be beyond constitutional purview.5 This is so because the decision
whether to accompany the nurse's dismissal with any procedural pro-
tections would not be an implementation of affirmative government
policy. Government funding alone would not render the clinic a "state
actor" subject to due process obligations. Thus, in my clinic, government
has chosen to use its funding effectively to "de-privatize" individual
speech where that transformation serves a permissible government end,
but has foregone extending to clinic employees any of the job protection
that the Constitution would itself confer if they were government em-
ployees. This is surely the worst of both private and public worlds.
I suggest that the Supreme Court has often written unpersuasively
in both doctrinal areas highlighted by my example, because it has failed
to elaborate a compelling normative vision underlying the public/private
distinction that these cases necessarily delineate. The law, to be accurate,
actually depicts three categories of action: action so private as to be
beyond any government's regulatory power, action public enough in its
implications to be regulable within the government's discretion, and
action so public or "governmental" in nature as to be subject auto-
2. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) supposedly narrowed
the scope of the relevant regulations, 42 C.F.R. 59.8-59.10 (1991), in a March 20, 1992
memorandum, reprinted 138 Cong. Rec. 54252 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1992), from Deputy
Assistant Secretary William Archer III to regional HHS administrators. Although the
intended impact of this memorandum is uncertain, it appears that clinic employees other
than physicians remain subject to the speech restriction described in text.
3. Rust v. Sullivan, III S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding Title X restrictions on employee
speech in federally funded family planning clinics).
4. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985)
(overturning summary dismissal of school employee whose job tenure was protected by
regulations limiting removability).
5. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982) (upholding summary
dismissals of staff members from private school financed almost entirely through public
funding sources).
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matically to the regulation of the federal Constitution. Instead of at-
tending to the substantive purposes served by this doctrinal
conceptualization of human behavior, the Court's discussions in cases
dependent on some assessment of the private/public distinction have
become aridly formal and obfuscatory.
My argument is that the boundaries of public and private action
would be assigned more constructively by attending to substantive notions
of responsibility. Indeed, what the public/private distinction most use-
fully implements is a conceptualization of the world in which the human
capacity for responsible action is maximized. A broad conception of
what is "public" creates opportunities for the community to affirm its
responsibilities to individuals and to assure that individuals fulfill their
responsibilities to one another and to the community. An expansive
conception of what is "private" preserves a realm of unregulated activity
and a conception of human autonomy that makes conventional liberal
notions of individual responsibility comprehensible. In deciding what is
public and what is private in state action or in free speech cases, courts
should assess the impacts of either determination on society's discharge
of its responsibilities to individuals, the fulfillment of each person's
responsibilities to other individuals and to the community as a whole,
and the autonomy individuals must enjoy if they are to have any capacity
for responsible behavior.
I. STATE ACTION AND COMMUNAL RESPONSIBILITY TO THE PERSON
The state action doctrine, like the law of federalism, is generally
understood as being protective of individual liberty.6 By limiting the
direct regulatory reach of the Constitution to government action, the
Court respects a presumptive realm of private autonomy that, if regulable
at all, may be regulated only by political action more recent and less
entrenched than the Constitution. So, too, the Tenth Amendment asserts
the existence of a realm of state and local activity beyond the reach of
national regulation.7
Federalism, however, is also understood to have a constructive char-
acter vis-a-vis that particular actor-the federal government-that the
doctrine also limits. Federalism theory embodies a commitment that the
6. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2753 (1982)
(The state action limitation "preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach
of federal law.").
7. Although Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct.
1005 (1985), repudiated the judicial enforceability of the Tenth Amendment as a protection
for states against federal legislation of general applicability, the Supreme Court recently
resuscitated that Amendment as a limit on Congress's power to direct the states' use of
their regulatory power. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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federal government shall not be denied the capacity to fulfill its con-
stitutionally assigned functions effectively. The competence of national
authority is thus an ideal coexistent, if always in tension with, the ideal
of local autonomy in Tenth Amendment doctrineA
The Supreme Court, however, has never set forth the constructive
character of state action doctrine except in a near-tautological way. The
positive value of the state action doctrine lies in avoiding the imposition
of unjustified liability on government for private acts,9 which implicitly
has the consequence of conserving state resources for better uses. This
explanation comes close to saying no more, however, than that state
action doctrine is justified because it avoids unjustified consequences.
It offers no explanation at all of the good that is accomplished by
accurately diagnosing purportedly private action as the action of gov-
ernment. Any compelling understanding of a constructive aspect of the
state action doctrine would have to specify a positive vision of what
the Constitution accomplishes when it does apply. The achievement of
that vision, like the preservation of federal regulatory competence as a
goal of federalism, would deserve our allegiance alongside the anti-
regulatory aim of preserving negative liberty.
An important suggestion of such a vision lies in Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Company,0 in which the Supreme Court held the use
of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges in civil actions to be
an unconstitutional denial of equal protection. I do not take as my text,
however, the Supreme Court decision handed down just eight days before
Judge Rubin died. Instead, I look to Judge Rubin's dissent from the
en banc Fifth Circuit opinion that the Supreme Court reversed." This
was not Judge Rubin's only experience of seeing his views turned into
Supreme Court pronouncement, but his Edmonson dissent, I think, is
especially revealing of its author's character.
The relevant facts of Edmonson are simple. The case involved a
personal injury claim by an African-American employee against his
construction company-employer. In federal court for a jury trial, the
employer used its three peremptory challenges to exclude two blacks
and one white from the jury venire. Edmonson, relying on the Supreme
Court's decision invalidating racially discriminatory challenges in criminal
trials,' asked that the employer be required to give a racially neutral
explanation for its exclusion of the black jurors. The trial court held,
8. See generally Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and
Federalism, 91 Yale L.J. 1317, 1369 (1982).
9. 457 U.S. at 936-37, 102 S. Ct. at 2753-54.
10. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
11. 895 F.2d 218, 227 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Rubin, J., dissenting), vacated, 860
F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1989).
12. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986).
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however, that no such requirement applied in civil proceedings. The jury
eventually found in favor of Edmonson on the issue of employer neg-
ligence, but it also found him eighty percent contributorily negligent
and reduced his recovery accordingly. He then sought a new trial, relying
on the employer's possible use of racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges.
The basis for the employer's argument was that the use -of per-
emptory challenges in a civil proceeding was not governmental action
controlled directly by the Constitution at all. Those judges accepting
that argument 3 emphasized that the privately retained counsel for the
employer was not implementing any policy endorsed, encouraged, or
required by the state. "Clearly," the Fifth Circuit concluded, private
counsel cannot be a state actor if "even a public defender, paid by the
state, in a criminal proceeding against an indigent defendant is not."'
4
The one acknowledged state actor on the scene-namely, the trial
judge-had been performing what the pro-employer appellate jurists
considered "the merely ministerial function of excusing the veniremen
cut by counsel from further attendance in the case."' 5 Perceiving the
judge's action as "mere ... acquiescence" in private choice, these jurists
determined that any racism latent in the peremptory challenges could
not be attributed to government or voided under the Constitution. As
Justice O'Connor summed up: "Arbitrary discrimination based on race
is particularly abhorrent when manifest in a courtroom, a forum es-
tablished by the government for the resolution of disputes through 'quiet
rationality.' But ... [t]he Government is not responsible for a per-
emptory challenge by a private litigant."'"
The Supreme Court majority reached a different conclusion, relying
on a series of ostensibly technical doctrinal tests for discerning "state
action." Justice Kennedy's opinion determined that the exclusion of civil
jurors through peremptory challenges depends on the "significant par-
ticipation" of government. '7 It deemed the constitution of juries to be
a "traditional function of the government."' 8 It concluded that the
injury inflicted by race-based peremptories was "aggravated in a unique
way by ... incidents of governmental authority," namely, the courtroom
setting.19 On these bases, the majority held that the use of peremptories
13. These include Judge Gee in dissent on the original appellate panel, the Fifth
Circuit en banc majority, and the Chief Justice together with Justices O'Connor and
Scalia in dissent on the Supreme Court.
14. 895 F.2d at 222, citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 102 S. Ct. 445
(1981).
15. 860 F.2d at 1316; see also 895 F.2d at 221.
16. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2095 (1991).
17. Id. at 2084.
18. Id. at 2085.
19. Id. at 2083 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S. Ct. 836 (1948)).
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does represent state action and may not be based solely on racial animus.
Judge Rubin's careful parsing of the state action precedents presaged
each of these results,2 0 but there is one theme he evoked more em-
phatically and with a decidedly non-technocratic passion:
By presiding over jury selection in his official, governmental
capacity, a judge is intimately involved in a process that Toc-
queville termed America's "greatest advantage" in "rub[bing]
off th[e] private selfishness which is the rust of society." By
carrying out his duties in a way that permits peremptory chal-
lenges based on race, the rust of the judge's approval of dis-
crimination rubs off onto society, corroding the national character
by giving private prejudice the imprimatur of state approval....
On its face, it is discriminatory state action for the government
itself to establish and maintain a system of jury selection that
authorizes blatant racial discrimination by litigants using the
courts set up by, paid for, and operated by the government .2
Conspicuous in this passage is Judge Rubin's sense of a judge's fiduciary
responsibility to the society the judge serves, a responsibility corrupted
by any complicity in the facilitation of racial bigotry. We recognize such
dereliction for what it is because, however resistant private racism re-
mains to wholesale elimination, our constitutional processes-embodied
not only in venerated documents, but also in the daily deliberations of
legislative, executive, and judicial authorities-have established antiracism
as a core value of public life. To maintain constitutional government
is to propagate this value.
The ideal of government implicit in Judge Rubin's analysis can be
further generalized. We can think of constitutional government as more
generally representing both a society's capacity to identify fundamental
value commitments and to keep faith with those commitments in its
public transactions. Thus, "correct" determinations of the state action
boundary enable a community not only to protect an important realm
of unregulated personal autonomy, but also to assure appropriate space
for the affirmation of those common values for which constitutionalism,
at its best, can stand. This is the constructive side of state action doctrine.
The affirmation of common values is one of the most strengthening
functions that society can perform for its members. Assuming the values
are well chosen, society's steadfastness in sustaining those values rescues
its members from a state of constant uncertainty in which each indi-
vidual's sense of personal security, respect, tolerance, and fair play is
20. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218, 228-33 (5th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (Rubin, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 233 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
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put at risk and must constantly be renegotiated in every transaction in
which he or she participates. Strong community values make it unnec-
essary, for example, for each individual seeking a job, an education,
or some similarly important good, to argue whether such goods may
be appropriately withheld on grounds of race, religion, political belief,
or even mere whim. Once a community elevates some value to consti-
tutional status, the public pursuit of that value can be seen to discharge
the government's most basic obligations to the people.
Reconstructing state action doctrine to attend to the affirmation of
public values would not reverse every Supreme Court decision in which
state action was found absent. It would argue, however, for a different
form of analysis. Such cases routinely involve purportedly private de-
cision making (a) that stands in some close proximity to government,
and (b) that, if ascribed to government, would be unconstitutional.
When such decision making is facilitated in any nontrivial way by
government licensing, funding, or ancillary activity, courts should be at
least as concerned that constitutional adjudication not forego an ap-
propriate opportunity for promoting fundamental constitutional values
as we are about abridging the scope of unregulated private conduct.
My analysis would render Edmonson an easy case. Judge Rubin
correctly discerned that judges presiding without resistance over the use
of race-based peremptories to exclude African-Americans from an official
decision making role in the community cannot help but legitimate racism.
Unlike Justice O'Connor, he did not regard a judge's personal abhorrence
of racism, even if voiced, as providing adequate sustenance to the
Constitution's commitment to racial equality. Judges permitting arbitrary
peremptory challenges would fail in their own responsibilities to the
community, as well as preventing African-Americans from fulfilling their
roles as responsible citizens. Seen in this light, declaring race-based
peremptories to be state action is to affirm the constitutional value of
antiracism in the courtroom, to discharge society's obligations to racial
minorities, and to assure individual African-Americans a fair opportunity
to assume responsible roles in their communities.
Mine is not an argument, however, for finding state action whenever
state licensing, funding, or other supportive activity occurs in proximity
to some challenged private initiative. In any complex human interaction,
there exist multiple lines of actual or potential responsibility. Treating
private action as state action will always have the effect of affirming
constitutionalism and, to that extent, the community's responsibilities to
its members. In some instances, however, such treatment may undermine
the exercise of responsibility in other ways. Indeed, for courts to treat
all private action as essentially public and constitutionally controlled
might reasonably be thought to subvert our capacity to understand our
actions as expressions of our individualism, a capacity that is central
to our commonest notions of what it means to be morally accountable.
19921
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Thus, if a core aim of the state action doctrine is to maximize oppor-
tunities for each person, and for the community, to fulfill important
responsibilities, then the courts' focus on the general theme of respon-
sibility must look at interactions among the state and individual persons
quite broadly.
For example, Edmonson would appear to be a closer case if elim-
inating race-based peremptories would undermine the capacity of private
lawyers to fulfill their duties to their clients. That seems highly spec-
ulative. The only limit Edmonson places on a conscientious lawyer's
pursuit of a fair-minded jury is that the lawyer must be able to state
some reason, even if idiosyncratic, other than the juror's race, to explain
the exclusion. 22 It would also appear a closer case if, as Justice Scalia
argues in dissent,23 implementation of the restriction on peremptories
would undermine the capacity of civil courts to function efficaciously-
perhaps because the time and energy exhausted in demanding and re-
viewing reasons for apparent racial exclusions are too vast. This, too,
the majority disbelieved.
Finally, it would be a closer case if treating race-based peremptories
as state action would so deprive private lawyers of discretionary decision
making as to undermine their capacity to express themselves as auton-
omous,, and therefore, as responsible individuals in a society largely
committed to individualism. That possibility seems frivolous. So little
of any lawyer's life is consumed in the process of exercising peremptory
challenges in civil trials that this activity cannot possibly be critical to
any sane person's sense of self or to the sense of a person that is
reasonably held by others. In short, under what an administrative lawyer
might call a "responsibility impact analysis," recognition of race-based
peremptories as state action fulfills the constructive ideal of state action-
maintaining the constitutional value of antiracism-without undermining
any freedom from government constraint that individuals need to be
effectively responsible to themselves or others.
A court faced with a constitutional challenge to action that is
putatively private, but government funded, licensed, or otherwise directly
22. To measure the disadvantage Edmonson imposes on civil litigants, we would have
to know: (1) the possible racial generalizations on which lawyers would prefer to rely in
selecting a jury (e.g., "white jurors undervalue injuries to black victims"), (2) their
accuracy, (3) the likelihood that a juror substituted from a favored group will not exhibit
the same bias as the juror excluded on account of race, and (4) the likelihood that those
members of the disfavored racial group who exhibit the feared bias could not be excluded
through a reason that a court would accept as legitimate. It is unclear, to say the least,
whether these unknown data, if discovered, would strongly support the use of race-based
challenges as a rational litigation strategy. For this reason, I also regard the Supreme
Court's state action analysis barring a criminal defendant's use of race-based peremptories
as correct. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
23. 111 S. Ct. at 2095-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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facilitated should ask: Might the extension of the state action rubric to
this case result in an appropriate extension of important constitutional
values? Would it in any other way constitute or undermine the fulfillment
of the community's responsibilities to its citizens? Would extending
constitutional regulation to the challenged activity undermine the defen-
dant's capacity to fulfill responsibilities owed to others? Would it so
constrain defendants' permissible range of activity as to constitute a
threat to their ability to express their autonomous and responsible nature
generally?24
This analysis wholly and persuasively explains the Court's holding
in Polk County v. Dodson,2 on which the Edmonson dissent relied,
that a public defender's motion to withdraw from the appellate repre-
sentation of an indigent client on the ground that his claims were
frivolous was not "state action," and thus, could not be treated as a
potential denial of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
First, there is no fundamental constitutional value attached to the zealous
pursuit of appellate claims that counsel and a reviewing court determine
are frivolous. Treating the public defender's behavior as private action
thus does not thwart the fulfillment of society's obligations to the
defendant. Moreover, disabling the client from filing such claims could
not plausibly be regarded as denying his or her capacity for autonomous
moral action. And, of paramount importance, subjecting public defender
decisions of this sort to constitutional scrutiny could substantially threaten
their capacity to fulfill their responsibilities as counsel to all of their
clients. It would force them to take time irresponsibly from more de-
serving causes and to burden the judicial system with the adjudication
of arguments that counsel believes are without plausible merit.
Responsibility-based analysis of state action claims would appro-
priately extend Judge Rubin's insight into official responsibility by fo-
cusing on the entire array of responsibilities at stake in a disputed
transaction. The premise of the analysis that may seem vaguest is my
concern that we not treat private action as state action where to do so
24. To the extent this analysis entails important value judgments, it might be urged
that the current state action doctrine also serves the cause of democracy by leaving such
judgments to elected bodies that have the capacity, through legislation, to extend the
Constitution's protections of liberty and property. It might, therefore, be an objection to
my analysis that the approach goes too far in empowering unelected courts to regulate
activity that has some claim to being left alone. A detailed argument on this score goes
beyond the scope of the essay, but I do not intend to suggest I have any faith that the
value judgments of judges are any more or less likely to be sound than those of legislators.
On the other hand, if I succeed in adumbrating a view of the Constitution that is
normatively more appealing than that embodied in current doctrine, I do not think it a
strong argument that judges would play a key role in its implementation. See generally
Peter M. Shane, Rights, Remedies, and Restraint, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 531 (1989).
25. 454 U.S. 312, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981).
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would undermine people's capacity to exhibit or experience themselves
as autonomous and, therefore, as morally responsible individuals. A
great deal is built into this, including a certain resignation to this society's
philosophically contestable allegiance to robust individualism, but the
basic idea is familiar. A commonplace transaction deeply shaped and
facilitated by the state is marriage. Yet, it would be dangerous to treat
as state action an individual's refusal to marry an otherwise worthy
partner solely on grounds of race, religion, sex, or nationality. To submit
such decision making to constitutional review would be flagrantly at
odds with the conception of choice that lies at the heart of the prevailing
social idea of why people marry. 6 Your selection as my partner means
one thing in a world where my choice is unconstrained. It means
something wholly different to me, to you, and to the community, in a
world in which I am foreclosed by state power from excluding you as
a marriage partner on grounds of bigotry. Of course, assessing the
constitutionality of marital choices sounds so preposterous that I assume
the category of such autonomy-threatening cases is fairly small.
Hard cases, however, will present themselves. Consider, because they
have so recently been the subject of such controversy, the general cat-
egory of parades. Many public parades entail special police protection
and typically involve some sort of government licensing. They are not
only visible to the public generally, but also occur on public property.
Should the decisions of parade organizers to exclude would-be marchers
on grounds forbidden to government decision makers be considered
unconstitutional state action?
I would answer affirmatively-for some parades. The New Orleans
City Council made history in 1991 by prohibiting Mardi Gras parades
by organizations that exclude members on the basis of race, religion,
sex, or sexual orientation. 27 Though it seems a radical suggestion under
prevailing precedent, perhaps a good case should already have been
available that such exclusions, at least where impermissible for the City
Council's own parades, were already unconstitutional. Mardi Gras pa-
rades are among the most significant cultural events that define the New
Orleans community as a whole. They are touted both by government
bodies (and by near-governmental bodies, such as the Chamber of Com-
merce) not as the specific expressions of discrete and ideologically defined
groups, but as generally and fundamentally representative of what New
Orleans is. One might have thought these parades "governmental" even
if policed wholly by private security guards and mounted without express
government licensing of any sort. In any event, I would easily regard
26. See generally Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale
L.J. 624 (1980).
27. Larry Rohter, Bias Law Casts Pall (sic) Over New Orleans Mardi Gras, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 2, 1992 at 1, 18.
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the parades now as "state action" because their deeply public character
is conjoined with significant efforts by public authorities to facilitate
the parades.
On the other hand, a parade conducted by an ideologically distinct
group and constituting a form of advocacy for that group's beliefs might
well be regarded as private action, even if licensed, policed, and otherwise
facilitated by government decision makers who do not purport to endorse
anything about the group but its right to self-expression. To take the
most obvious example, it should at least be debatable whether a con-
stitutional right exists on behalf of black and Jewish would-be marchers
to join an ad hoc KKK parade, so long as they desire to express the
message the parade is intended to advocate. 28
The reason is not that contacts between a KKK parade and the
government would necessarily be insufficient to sustain a finding of state
action, but rather that society's responsibility to oppose bigotry stead-
fastly must compete in this context with another plausible claim about
responsibility. The claim is that there is an important relationship between
understanding persons as autonomous moral actors and their enjoying
some right to associate on an expressly exclusionary basis in public to
demonstrate a group belief in exclusion. This relationship may not be
strong enough to withstand a properly enacted legislative determination
that no racially or religiously exclusionary parades be permitted on public
property. Just as private clubs that do not represent intimate associations
may be subjected to antidiscrimination laws regarding membership, a
case could be made that even advocacy parades must be open to all
persons avowing the shared belief.29 The relationship between personal
autonomy and the opportunity for public expression of shared beliefs,
however, is strong enough to overcome the argument for direct consti-
tutional control of the conduct of ideologically expressive parades.
II. THE Rust Doctrine and Individual Responsibility
The theme of responsibility can also be used to inform another set
of cases where the formalistic treatment of the private/public distinction
28. This may, of course, be a null set. If a KKK chapter desires to parade in support
of the proposition that white Christians ought not cooperate in any project with Jews or
African-Americans, members of the latter groups could not logically assert both that they
share the KKK's belief and that they want to be part of the KKK parade.
29. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984);
Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 107 S. Ct.
1940 (1987); New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 108 S. Ct.
2225 (1988). On the other hand, the private club cases might be distinguishable on the
ground that the Court regarded membership in the clubs involved as conferring important
benefits, but not as significantly expressing the members' beliefs. Participating in an
advocacy parade is unlikely to be a source of substantial benefits and does significantly
express the marchers' beliefs.
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can produce horrible results. These involve the permissibility of gov-
ernment regulation of speech and expressive activity connected with
government employment and other publicly funded programs. If state
action decisions too often underweigh values of community responsibility
in contention with personal autonomy, decisions concerning what I would
call "speech discipline" often pay but lip service to values of personal
expression once public funding signals a relationship between government
efficiency and the regulation of speech.
One area in which the Supreme Court has recently been sensitive
to the responsibility values I am discussing involves political patronage.
During the last two decades, the Court has substantially limited patronage
as an acceptable form of discipline for civil servants. Except when a
government official is performing a function for which party loyalty
might reasonably be thought a factor relevant to effective job perform-
ance, it is unlawful to discharge, 0 to refuse to hire or promote, or
otherwise to adversely treat that civil servant solely on the ground of
partisan affiliation.3 Put simply, when a public employee's political
affiliation cannot reasonably be thought to compromise the government's
ability to discharge its responsibilities, the government is not entitled to
disable aspects of an employee's political commitment that lie at the
core of responsible citizenship.
Lower courts, however, have not always carried this rationale to its
logical conclusion. In McBee v. Jim Hogg County, Texas,32 the Fifth
Circuit confronted the case of a newly elected sheriff who refused to
reappoint several deputies and dispatchers in his office who had sup-
ported his predecessor in the Democratic primary campaign. Neither the
deputies nor the dispatchers played a policy role that would have per-
mitted a dismissal on grounds of partisan affiliation 3 and the district
court ordered these employees reinstated. An en banc majority, however,
remanded for a determination of whether the dismissals should have
been upheld. The court suggested that the employees' lack of personal
support for the winning candidate in an intra-party context might have
exhibited sufficient hostility in light of the close working relationships
involved to outweigh the employees' interest in unfettered electoral choice.
Judge Rubin vigorously dissented. The trial court had not found
any evidence that "the political beliefs or voting history of any of the
Plaintiffs in any way impaired their fairness or efficiency on the job. '34
Judge Rubin thought it determinative of the employees' rights that the
30. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S. Ct. 2673 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507, 100 S. Ct. 1287 (1980).
31. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 2729 (1990).
32. 730 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
33. Id. at 1023 (Rubin, J., dissenting) (quoting the district court's findings).
34. Id.
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record disclosed no actual connection between the employees' political
expression and the government's capacity to discharge its responsibilities.
Contrary to the majority, he would have given controlling weight to
the danger that a rule of personal patronage would pose to the capacity
of government employees to function as responsible voters and citizens.
If government officials could arbitrarily redefine the personal loyalty of
subordinates as dedication to the government's mission, a figure like
the sheriff of Jim Hogg County could unjustly deprive dissenting em-
ployees of their jobs and the community of these employees' services.
Although Judge Rubin did not say so explicitly, this is a risk much to
be feared given how easily employers tend to conflate personal loyalty
with professional effectiveness.
Despite the care with which the Supreme Court has weighed the
competing interests in patronage cases, other "speech discipline" deci-
sions display no such sensitivity. To note a much debated example, Rust
v. Sullivan" upheld the authority of the Department of Health and
Human Resources to prohibit federally funded family planning clinics
from engaging in counseling or advocacy regarding abortion, or from
referring pregnant women for abortion. The Supreme Court did not
regard the relevant HHS regulations under Title X of the Public Health
Service Act36 as attempting to censor a particular viewpoint, but rather
as a neutral government attempt to focus its funded programs on a
permissibly defined mission of family planning. The rational relationship
between the restriction on speech and the preservation of the government
program's "integrity" in terms of its devotion to an assigned purpose
was held sufficient to render the restriction constitutional." I believe
Rust to have been clearly wrong in its constitutional holding but think
the point clearer if I preface discussion of that case with a more general
analysis of the values at stake.
The foundational premise of a case such as Rust is unassailable.
Government must have some power of speech discipline as an incident
of its authority to implement otherwise lawful programs." For example,
instructors in public institutions-even public law schools-may presum-
ably be told to confine their in-class speech to the subjects they have
been hired to teach. Geography teachers may be disciplined for iden-
tifying national capitals incorrectly. Government employees may pre-
35. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 et seq (1988).
37. 111 S. Ct. at 1769-71.
38. 1 am not dealing here with speech restrictions imposed for their own sake in
order to avoid a serious danger of some imminent and serious harm that the government
has the power to prevent. Prohibitions, for example, against fraudulent consumer claims
are presumably "government programs" in themselves, and do not seek justification as
implementing some other set of activities.
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sumably be forbidden to make personal phone calls during office hours,
and government employers need not tolerate insubordinate or disruptive
speech that addresses no issue of public concern. 9 In sum, the effective
discharge of government functions depends on some level of discipline,
and some of what must be disciplined in order to achieve the functions
of government will inevitably be speech.
If the speech discipline power is thoughtlessly expanded, however,
dangerous consequences could result. Some such constraint may be ra-
tionally related to the implementation of certain government functions,
but it is still suppression. At the very least, it exists in tension with the
government's responsibility to protect First Amendment values. Speech
restrictions may impose specific and concrete harms by preventing the
communication of important information, and because there is virtually
no large-scale public activity in this country that is free of government
funding, the sheer amount of speech that may be curtailed by virtue
of its proximity to government funding is vast.4°
It is easy enough to posit some stark cases where 9peech discipline
is obviously permissible and others where it clearly should not be.
Requiring teachers to teach their subjects seems obviously permissible,
while forbidding math teachers to mention prime numbers ought to be
unconstitutional. Is it possible, however, to move from stark cases to
some principled theory as to the limits on government's power? In this
respect, the responsibility-based analysis invoked above to analyze state
action is again useful. As a matter of simple logic, enabling the gov-
ernment to implement permissible programs effectively is the only jus-
tification for speech discipline based solely on a "program integrity"
rationale. Thus, when an instance of speech discipline is challenged, it
is appropriate to examine the challenge in terms of what the government's
rule accomplishes in terms of the fulfillment of legitimate government
purposes and what adverse effects, if any, it imposes upon the exercise
of responsibility in other forms.
This calculus helps to identify the easy cases for assessing the im-
position of speech discipline as a means of achieving government program
integrity. Although a rule requiring teachers to focus on their subjects
39. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983) (upholding discharge
of assistant district attorney for insubordinate speech deemed to relate predominantly to
private employment grievance).
40. "[Flew large-scale endeavors are today not supported, directly or indirectly, by
government funds-from the health care of senior citizens, to farm subsidies, to the
construction of weaponry, to name but a few of the most obvious. . . . [An invitation
to government censorship wherever public funds flow ... would ... present an enormous
threat to the First Amendment rights of American citizens and to a free society." Board
of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472, 478 (D.D.C.
1991).
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exists in some tension with government's commitment to free speech in
theory, it clearly promotes the government's ability to assure students
and parents an effective performance of the teachers' role. It betrays
no social responsibility to government employees or to the public. It
does not seriously diminish the capacity of employees to function as
responsible individuals or to maintain their identity as autonomous moral
actors. By contrast, a math teacher prohibited from mentioning prime
numbers cannot fulfill his or her responsibility actually to teach math.
Such a speech rule could not be regarded as furthering any reasonable
governmental enterprise.
Responsibility-based analysis, however, points also to more difficult
cases. For example, imagine that a school board hires a special AIDS
counselor for its high school and insists that any teacher, confronted
with a student request for AIDS information, limit his or her response
to referring the student to the designated counselor. The counselor, the
board feels, is not only the most likely person to have accurate and
timely information, but is the one it knows to be trained in presenting
this information in a manner accessible to teenagers and appropriate to
its sensitivity.
In the government's favor, it is easy enough to understand the
reasoning that restricting teachers' speech about AIDS is rationally re-
lated to the effective transmission of accurate AIDS information. How-
ever, unlike rules requiring geography teachers to identify state capitals
correctly or requiring history teachers not to misidentify important dates,
this rule can diminish a teacher's capacity to serve a particular student
and, to some extent, may undermine the government's overall goals.
One can easily imagine anxious students willing to seek counseling from
familiar and trusted teachers, who would simply not be willing to consult
the AIDS counselor, who may be a relative stranger. Restraining teacher
speech in this circumstance may create a serious health risk to students.
It is plausible that courts would uphold such a rule as constitutional,
given the deference usually accorded educational authorities in making
pedagogical judgments. Still, the rule should not be treated as obviously
valid, precisely because of the complex network of responsibilities at
work.
But there is another category of difficult cases-difficult not because
of uncertainty as to proper result, but rather as to simple characteri-
zation. Consider again the prime number example. I asserted above that
a speech rule prohibiting publicly funded math instructors from men-
tioning prime numbers would blatantly undermine the capacity of math
teachers to fulfill their responsibilities to teach the subject of mathe-
matics. But what if the government responded: "The speech restriction
is rationally related to instruction in 'mathematics' as the government
defines it, namely, calculation and theorizing using only numbers divisible
by numbers other than themselves and one." The government's defense,
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in other words, is that it is entitled to define "mathematics" in a wholly
novel way. Having chosen its description of the field of math to exclude
prime numbers, government may then impose speech discipline rationally
designed to insure "program integrity."
This example seems absurd because the government's definition of
math fails the "we-all-know" test, namely, we all know that the study
of math includes the study of prime numbers. There may be a desire
to devote some study to non-prime numbers as a field, and the gov-
ernment might be entitled to organize a program in "Non-Prime Number
Study." What the government is not entitled to do is to treat the study
of non-prime numbers as the equivalent of "mathematics." "We all
know" that math embraces prime numbers. Thus, even if non-prime
numbers are to be the main focus of study, it is irrational to prohibit
all mention of prime numbers if the program purports to be "mathe-
matics."
But what about subtler definitional denials of reality? A school
district might proffer a course in World War II history that prohibits
the mention of any evidence that the Holocaust occurred. One hopes
"we all know" that Holocaust revisionism is fiction, in a way that
precludes government from labeling a program of revisionism instruction
as "history," but there is a degree of controversy here that does not
attend prime number study.
To take another familiar example, one could imagine a publicly
funded course on biology that prohibits the presentation of creationism
as "science." Is such speech discipline permissible because "we all know"
that the government's demarcation of biology as a field that excludes
creationism is.rational? Why "we all know" these things poses difficult
questions, despite what seems the near certainty that school districts
could not insist that Holocaust revisionism be presented as fact, but
could insist that creationism be presented exclusively as religious phi-
losophy.4'
It is not stating a rationale for my posited holdings that is difficult.
It seems obvious that government should not be able to defend the
suppression of speech on the ground that such suppression rationally
implements an irrational program. The effective implementation of an
arbitrary construction of reality is not a proper exercise of governmental
responsibility. If government had such discretion, plus the consequent
capacity to prevent any publicly funded speech beyond the arbitrary
boundaries of an Orwellian program description, the implications-given
how much social programs depend on government funding-would be
ominous.
41. Cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987).
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What is difficult about my examples is knowing when the govern-
ment's program description amounts to an arbitrary attempt to recon-
struct reality. We can defend the assertion that courses excluding prime
numbers from recognition, treating Holocaust revisionism as fact, and
purveying creationism as science may not rationally be purveyed as Math,
History, and Biology. Each of these fields has a wide degree of con-
ventional recognition outside government. There exist conventionally rec-
ognized experts in these fields, the majority of whom would not assent
to the accuracy of the government's construction of reality. There are
conventionally accepted methods for identifying and assessing evidence,
which have led most mathematicians, historians, and biologists to accept
prime numbers, the Holocaust, and some version of evolution as reality.
But we cannot do better than this. However imaginary may be my
mathematical example, there are "serious-sounding ' 42 people who deny
the Holocaust 43 and serious-sounding people who subscribe to "creation
science."" If all that is needed to authorize the government's imple-
mentation of an alternative reality is the existence of enough political
support among serious-sounding people, opposing my hypothesized speech
restrictions in principle would be far more difficult.
The Title X regulations reviewed in Rust are susceptible to similar
analysis. The rules purport to implement a program of public funding
for "family planning." A government that favors family planning, but
not abortion, has a number of constitutional options under prevailing
doctrine. Instead of funding "family planning clinics," it can fund clinics
for "fetal health and preservation." It can fund family planning clinics
generally, but provide actual services within those clinics that do not
include abortion. It can fund informational advertising on adoption
procedures, even if it does not fund informational advertising on abor-
tion.
The Rust regulations, however, amounted to a significantly different
tactic. Congress provided the possibility of federal funding for programs
of "family planning," including counseling in that field. HHS purported
to understand "family planning" in a wholly conventional sense, as a
"process of establishing objectives for the number and spacing of one's
children and selecting the means by which these objectives may be
42. I use this phrase advisedly to point out that purveyors of Holocaust revisionism
often adopt the seemingly high rhetoric of academe to present their arguments. One hopes
the rhetorical strategy will prove insufficient to camouflage the anti-Semitism embodied
in such mendacity.
43. Karen J. Winkler, How Should Scholars Respond to Assertions That the Holocaust
Never Happened?, Chron. of Higher Educ., Dec. 11, 1991, at A8.
44. See generally 482 U.S. 578, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987); McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of
Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (discussing Institute for Creation Science).
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achieved. '45 The speech discipline imposed by HHS, however, sought
to recreate "family planning" as an activity that, even for informational
purposes, excludes the phenomenon of abortion, at least in all but the
most dire emergency circumstances.46 It prohibited not only the en-
couragement, promotion, or advocacy of abortion, but any "counseling
concerning the use of abortion as a method of family planning. ' 47 This
should have been viewed as equivalent to an attempt to treat the study
of non-prime numbers as the totality of "mathematics."
The very fact that a decision to choose abortion was constitutionally
protected at the time of Rust 8 should have been enough to certify that
"family planning," as a realm of discussion and counseling, must include
abortion. In terms of conventional understanding of abortion's status
as a method of family planning, however, there is, of course, wholly
non-doctrinal evidence. Despite decreases in public funding, the number
of U.S. women obtaining abortions each year is about 1.5 million, which
represents a termination of roughly one third of all pregnancies. 49 The
overwhelming majority of adult Americans accepts the medical and moral
appropriateness of abortion in at least some circumstances.5 0 The pre-
vailing medical view likewise supports abortion as an appropriate medical
procedure. For all these reasons, the government should be denied the
power to define, for purposes of discussion, the "process of establishing
objectives for the number and spacing of one's children and selecting
the means by which these objectives may be achieved" as a process
that excludes abortion.
This approach differs somewhat from the dissent in Rust, which
offered persuasive grounds for overturning the Title X gag rule as an
45. 42 C.F.R. § 59.2 (1991).
46. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (a)(2), (b)(2) (1991).
47. 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.8(a)(1), 59.10 (a) (1991).
48. As I write this, as when Rust was decided, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.
Ct. 705 (1973), is still "good law." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). The tension between Rust and Roe was analyzed in
dissent by Justice Blackmun. Ill S. Ct. at 1784-86. Under the analysis offered above,
however, the field of discourse called "family planning" could not be constitutionally
narrowed to exclude discussion of abortion regardless of the constitutional status of the
abortion right.
Should Roe be overturned, it is possible, of course, that abortion might become
unlawful in certain jurisdictions. The government then, as now, would presumably be
entitled to constrain its grantees not to provide counseling on unlawful family planning
methods generally, which would have the effect of eliminating abortion counseling in
those jurisdictions where abortion is outlawed. The rationale for such a speech rule,
however, would not be family planning "program integrity," but avoiding government
involvement in counseling state criminal offenses.
49. Abortion in America Remains on a Plateau, Nat'l J., May 2, 1987, at 1096;
Rosalind Petchesky, Giving Women a Real Choice, The Nation, May 28, 1990, at 732.
50. Richard Morin, They Hear a Different Drummer, Wash. Post Nat'l Weekly
Edition, Apr. 13-19, 1992, at 38.
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impermissible attempt to censor a point of view. 5 The key difference
is that a rule against arbitrary limits on a field of discourse would work
irrespective of the motive or intent behind speech suppression. It would
not excuse a gag rule, for example, on the ground that some pro-choice
government administrators may have favored the rule for fear that the
phenomenon of publicly funded counselors discussing abortion would
prove so effective an anti-choice organizing target that the net political
result would put rights of choice even more seriously at risk. It would
not excuse a gag rule, such as my hypothetical suppression of primary
numbers, on the ground that, even though suppression of the topic
seemed arbitrary, that suppression did not seem to favor or disfavor a
particular viewpoint. It would likewise not excuse a speech suppression
rule adopted in ignorance, for example, because a curriculum planner
sincerely thought creationism really represented scientific consensus.
There are a number of things this analysis would not accomplish.
It would not bar government from disallowing publicly funded counselors
from engaging in on-the-job advocacy for or against any position related
to any aspect of family planning. It would not require government to
fund all family planning activities equally. It would go no further than
disallowing the option of purporting to fund a field of discourse and
then redefining it arbitrarily.
Critics of Rust might complain, however, that this approach is too
formalistic, and thus, too easy to evade. To repeat an earlier example,
it would seemingly not prohibit Congress from offering funding to "fetal
protection clinics," whose employees might then be forbidden to counsel
clients on any matter not related directly to fetal protection. If abortion
cannot be excluded from discourse on "family planning," then the
government could simply redefine the field of discourse to "fetal sur-
vival."
This concern may be less weighty in practice than in theory because
formalistic moves available in hypotheticals are often unavailable in real
politics. The very wording of Title X underscores Congress's interest in
funding family planning as a broad range of activities.12 The more
narrowly a proposed statute defines the purposes of public funding, the
harder it should become to secure a majority coalition to support the
funding. Opposition to the Title X regulations in Congress has been so
51. 111 S. Ct. at 1780-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52. The Secretary is authorized to make grants to and enter into contracts
with public or nonprofit private entities to assist in the establishment and
operation of voluntary family planning projects which shall offer a broad range
of acceptable and effective family planning methods and services (including
natural family planning methods, infertility services, and services for adoles-
cents) ....
42 U.S.C. § 300 (a) (1988).
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great that it is difficult to imagine there would have been a majority
coalition to support a bill that expressly excluded abortion from what
could be discussed as a matter of family planning) 3
Nonetheless, so long as formalistic dodges are available to circumvent
any limit on government authority, the temptation may exist to employ
them. We should be concerned about a constitutional interpretation that
would prohibit the suppression of Holocaust-related discussion in a
course called "World War II History," but that would permit its sup-
pression in a course entitled, "History of Every Aspect of World War
II Other Than the Holocaust." One would want judges to have the
ability to examine such retitled programs to see whether they are, in
fact, bona fide attempts to focus government energies on a permissible,
limited enterprise, or rather subtle, but unjustifiable barriers to speech
appropriately connected with a funded activity.
Judges would, I think, have such an ability if they employed the
sort of responsibility analysis advanced above in connection with state
action. Government will invariably seek to portray its speech discipline
rules as rationally related to the effective fulfillment of government
responsibilities. Such claims are quite likely to appear most dubious
when their effect is largely to impinge on what would conventionally
be understood in the larger community as the personal or communal
responsibilities of the individuals subject to regulation. For example, the
gag rule in Rust operates to constrain communications between health
care workers and clients. Such constraints obviously impinge on a form
of interaction in which unconstrained communication is typically thought
essential both to the professional's responsible discharge of his or her
role and the client's responsible decision making. Arbitrary gag rules
on teachers are similarly likely to appear as conspicuously interfering
with what a community would conventionally regard as the teacher's
responsible discharge of his or her functions, and with the capacity of
students to form responsible opinions in light of relevant knowledge
and argument. The more seriously a speech discipline rule seems to
frustrate conventional understanding of the scope of free communication
essential to the responsible implementation of a particular function, the
more suspicious a court should be that a rule, however phrased, is
reconstructing a field of discourse in an arbitrary way. 4 Such rules
should be deemed to violate the First Amendment.
53. The political uncertainty in the current Congress is not whether a majority opposes
the Title X gag rules, but whether a bill overturning those rules could be enacted over
a presidential veto. Julie Rovner, Counseling Memo Nothing New, But Rules No Longer
in Limbo, Cong. Q. Weekly Rep., Mar. 28, 1992, at 807.
54. This analysis is consistent with Judge Harold Greene's decision invalidating on
First Amendment grounds a National Institutes of Health (NIH) bar to the publication,
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CONCLUSION
In linking the state action and speech discipline cases, I have really
argued three propositions. First, the devaluing of the public sphere in
state action cases underemphasizes an ideal of community responsibility
for which constitutional government should stand. Second, the mere fact
of government funding in the speech discipline cases has blinded the
Supreme Court to the ominous potential consequences for private au-
tonomy and responsible human interaction, which are critical values
linked to free speech doctrine. Third, a form of analysis to avoid both
sets of pitfalls would focus on the capacity of the community and of
individuals to function responsibly and for persons to develop as re-
sponsible moral actors. Applying these propositions to the family plan-
ning clinic hypothesized at the beginning of this essay would perhaps
invalidate even Title X regulations as currently interpreted and, in any
event, assure the discharged nurse a pre-termination hearing.
I realize that so much talk about vindicating what is properly deemed
public or private may seem hopelessly naive. Others have persuasively
shown how the public/private distinction is infinitely deconstructable,"
deployable for repressive ends,5 6 or both. With policy makers advocating
the "privatization" of virtually every government function, including
schooling, 57 adjudication," and incarceration,5 9 and "America's Funniest
Home Videos" a major form of national entertainment, any line between
the worlds of private and public looks thin indeed. What my arguments
seek to revive, however, is not a distinction for the sake of distinction,
but renewed attention to the values for which "public-ness" and "pri-
vate-ness" can stand-the benefits that we, both as individual citizens
and as a constitutional community, derive from what I have called
robust conceptions of public and private.
without NIH approval, of the preliminary results of any NIH-funded research. Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472, 476-77 (D.D.C.
1991) ("The plaintiff is of course a university. The subject of this lawsuit is the very
free expression that the Rust Court held to be so important for the functioning of
American society .... ).
55. Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,
130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349 (1982).
56. Frances E. Olson, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497 (1983).
57. See, e.g., Denis P. Boyle, et al., Education Ideas & Strategies for the 1990's,
Amer. Enterprise, Mar./Apr., 1991, at 25.
58. Curtis J. Sitomer, It's Speedy, Cut-Rate, and Confidential: Justice in Private
Courts, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 12, 1988, at 1.
59. See, e.g., David H. Folz & John M. Scheb II, Prisons, Profits, and Politics:
The Tennessee Privatization Experiment, Judicature, Aug., 1989, at 98.
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The argument is quite similar to Justice O'Connor's dissenting plea
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,6° for a re-
invigorated understanding of federalism. The "Framers," she argues,
were intent both on a national government competent to solve national
problems and "a republic whose vitality was assured by the diffusion
of power ... between the Federal Government and the states. "61 During
the eighteenth century, "those intentions did not conflict because tech-
nology had not yet converted every local problem into a national one." 62
Because of the emergence "of an integrated and national economy,"
however, these intentions now do conflict, and the principle of state
autonomy requires the Supreme Court, in O'Connor's view, "to enforce
affirmative limits on federal regulation of the States to complement the
judicially crafted expansion of the interstate commerce power.''63
The U.S. Constitution is intent on a nation of communal respon-
sibility and private autonomy, ideals in tension, I suppose, even in 1789,
but now invariably and conspicuously so under the technological and
cultural conditions of postmodernism. This tension does not render the
ideals obsolete, but does require us to police carefully what ought be
considered private or public in an effective pursuit of both responsive
community and individual liberty.
Judge Alvin Rubin embodied as deep a faith in the capacity of
human reason and responsibility as is possible for someone who was
also quite notably a realist. Any fair appreciation of just how much
Judge Rubin accomplished as a single human being, uniting his capacity
for reason and his passion for responsibility, suggests that our consti-
tutionalism would do well to follow his example more broadly.
60. 469 U.S. 528, 580, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1033 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 581, 105 S. Ct. at 1033.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 587, 105 S. Ct. at 1036.
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